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Complexity and coordination in London’s Silvertown Quays: how real 





This paper contributes to existing research on the relational work of real estate developers 
to demonstrate how internal corporate complexities create opaqueness in governance set-
tings and limit potential community engagement. This work is particularly pertinent at a time 
when there is renewed interest in the private sector, yet very little analysis which begins 
from the perspective of the developer. Drawing on the example of London’s Silvertown, this 
paper shows how the strategies of development organisations evident in existing research, 
including their work with the public sector, communities and experts, require multiple levels 
of internal co-ordination. I argue that because of these sub-centres of power developers are 
able to maintain a more deeply entrenched centrality in urban governance.  
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1. Introduction 
 
For more than three decades, developers have attempted to regenerate Silvertown Quays 
- part of London’s Royal Docks. After many years of little progress, the 2012 London Olym-
pics brought new energy to the project. In 2013, a development agreement was made be-
tween the landowners, the Mayor of London, and The Silvertown Partnership (TSP). After 
extensive deliberation, in 2016 TSP was granted planning permission by the London Bor-
ough of Newham, the local planning authority, to redevelop Silvertown Quays. This paper 
analyses the planning permission application to demonstrate how often hidden corporate 
strategies shape developers’ role in urban governance. This paper therefore builds on ex-
isting analysis of the relational work of developers and their capacity to navigate and organ-
ise the institutional settings in which they function (Fainstein, 2001; Weinstein, 2014; Weber, 
2015). I argue that this relational work is not the result of a single figure or central power, 
but rather is the product of and helps create sub-centres of control within the private sector. 
In turn, I argue these obfuscate responsibility during planning processes and minimise com-
munity capacity to shape urban governance. This paper therefore helps inform debates on 
the role of the private sector in urban governance because as Adams et al. note, unless the 
private sector is properly understood “the effectiveness of planning policy may be under-
mined, especially where the private sector is responsible for undertaking most development” 
(2012: 2577). Importantly, as has been well noted in existing literature, there are a multiplic-
ity of types of developers (Coiacetto, 2007). TSP is a private developer with a very particular 
corporate structure, a three-way partnership, as such it is by no means representative of 
developers across London or beyond. Instead it is used here to present an example of how 
some developers, especially “established players” (Developer 1, March 2017), shape urban 
governance. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: section two addresses existing literature on developers. 
Specifically it argues that existing research, in highlighting the breadth of relationships de-
velopers build over the course of a project, raises questions about developers’ capacity to 
navigate their extensive network and the consequences of their strategic response. Section 
three introduces my methods. Section four introduces Silvertown Quays and TSP. Section 
five argues TSP navigate their network by creating sub-centres of power, internal to the 
private sector. Section six argues that as a direct consequence developers are able to more 
deeply entrench themselves at the centre of the urban governance. 
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2. How developers navigate real estate processes 
 
The burgeoning literature on real estate developers has brought the role of ‘new city builders’ 
to the forefront of urban governance analysis (Fainstein, 2001). This work has responded to 
critiques made in the 2000s about the lacuna of research on developers’ behaviour (Coi-
acetto, 2001) and the importance of this for planning systems (Adams et al., 2012; Campbell 
et al., 2013). In doing so this work animates “the actual actors and institutions” (Weber 2015: 
30) of urban development to reveal different types of developers (Cioacetto, 2007; Rosen 
2017; Topolov, 1979), the multiplicity of functions they occupy within development pro-
cesses, and the web of relationships they build over the course of project development (Hal-
bert and Rouanet, 2014; Hyde, 2018; Robin, 2018; Weber, 2015). Crucially, in terms of de-
veloping a greater appreciation of the modus operandi of developers, this work has consid-
ered the importance of developers’ relationships and underlying power dynamics (Adams et 
al., 2012: 2584), to reveal how a core strategy for developers is the production of relation-
ships with the public sector, local communities, and the body of experts they rely on (Brill 
and Robin, 2018). 
 
2.1 Building relationships with the public sector 
 
Globally, critical urban research has argued developers exert agency and leverage close-
knit relationships with the public sector to maximise their financial returns. In a North Amer-
ican context, the relationship between developers and the state was historically interrogated 
through Logan and Molotch’s (1987) growth coalition thesis and later by urban regime theory 
(see Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989). Regime theory, hybridising political economy and political 
science pluralist approaches (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001) shows how the distribution of 
power means that only through collaborative efforts can the financial or economic capital of 
the private sector can be unified with the political capital of the local state. Regimes advanc-
ing particular policy agendas therefore occur in moments where individuals or institutions 
identify shared believes (Stone 1989). In the UK, whilst the case of the relative inapplicability 
of the growth coalition thesis has been made (see Cox, 2017), regime theory has been 
applied to analysis of regeneration schemes. For example, Holman (2007) shows how Ports-
mouth's regeneration was contingent on a ‘shared sense of purpose' across the public and 
private sector. This encourages research on schemes such as Silvertown to consider how 
policy agendas are stabilised, and the role of strategic relationships that straddle the public-
private sector divide, in achieving it. 
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Both growth coalition and regime theories highlight the important point that the state has 
always been involved in urban development, particularly housing provision (Aalbers, 2015; 
Rolnik, 2013), but its relationship with developers evolves over time and varies hugely by 
institutional setting. For example, Leffers’ (2017) work in Toronto reveals how developers 
are able to shape legal norms. This, he argues, partially relies on a consensus during inter-
views that developers would ‘win in court’, even if the law was not on their side. Meanwhile, 
in various Asian cities Shatkin’s (2008; 2011) research demonstrates the privatisation of 
planning, a situation which relies on close relationships between the state and market ac-
tors. He shows how in Manila, large scale developers’ visions for cities are prioritised by the 
local authorities in what he terms ‘bypass-implant urbanism’ (2008: 384). For Shatkin, the 
ability to redefine how the city is planned in a way that reflect the imperatives of capital 
accumulation is, at least partly, the product of how developers have “built relationships with 
government actors” (2008: 387).  
 
Shatkin (2014) also shows this deepening of connections between developers and the pub-
lic sector in India. He argues that the shift from modernist planning agendas towards eco-
nomic growth and capital accumulation has underpinned a changing urban politics that cen-
ters developers. In response to Mumbai’s complex institutional structure, one developer as-
sumed a “distinctive role as the project’s chief architect and advocate” (Weinstein, 2014: 
16). He was able to negotiate an often fragmented political situation by embedding “himself 
within the state’s planning bureaucracies” (ibid.). However, despite first appearing to form a 
strategic partnership across the public-private sector divide, the developer was unable to 
overcome institutional and administrative weaknesses on his own. In this way research has 
shown how developers’ agency is partly facilitated by what Roy (2009) argues is rule by 
informality in an Indian context. Additionally, this research highlights the importance of dif-
ferent scales of government, echoed by research elsewhere on the importance of the na-
tional state in shaping urban development outcomes, including developers’ strategies (Go-
tham, 2009; Wijburg, 2019). 
 
The capacity of developers to overcome institutional fragmentation through deliberate en-
gagement across political scales also resonates with work that highlights developers' 
broader abilities to reinvent planning policy. The planning system in London has been ac-
cused of granting developers a ‘tabula rasa’, enabling them to dictate the terms of develop-
ment trajectories (Duman et al., 2018). Following the 2012 London Olympics, models of 
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governance favoured ‘the activities of an elite group of private developers’ (Moore et al., 
2018: 27). Explicit in this analysis is the strength of developers, and their capacity to not just 
leverage the advantages of existing institutions, but to shape new policies in a way which 
benefits developers. This work is contingent on developers' relationship-building with state 
actors often resulting in a ‘revolving door’ between the public and private sector (Robin, 
2018). Moreover, Robin (2018) shows how the creation of an exceptional or extra-ordinary 
approach to the governance of King’s Cross, a development elsewhere in London,  was 
heavily dictated by intense engagement between (part of) the planning authority and the 
main developer (see also Imrie, 2009). This Robin shows, was aided by the movement of 
actors between developers and local authorities, extending the extent to which developers 
are making relationships that straddle the public-private sector divide (Weinstein, 2014). 
 
2.2 Building relationships with communities 
 
Research on developers’ interactions with communities is a second, though related, body of 
literature. This literature has revealed the extent to which developers navigate the political 
and planning uncertainty of local opposition through active engagement with communities 
(Geva and Rosen, 2018; Robin, 2018). In this respect, developers can define what consti-
tutes the relevant community in the context of their development, and in so doing exclude 
actors they would prefer to avoid engaging with. Hyde (2018) analyses the seemingly be-
nevolent actions of developers in Toronto and Vancouver to show how they are ‘giving back 
to get ahead’. Relational work with, or for, the community became an explicit strategy where 
developers incorporate - and often alter in doing so - community agendas into their strate-
gies (Domaradzka, 2019). This work draws on literature that questions whether participatory 
approaches in urban governance can overcome the limitations of top-down planning (All-
mendinger and Haughton, 2012; Brownill and Carpenter, 2009; Healey, 1998; Sagoe, 2018). 
 
Following a similar argument, Geva and Rosen’s (2018) analysis of developers’ strategies 
in Tel Aviv is particularly enlightening. They show how developers pro-actively shape com-
munity engagement to eliminate the threat it poses, through what they term the ‘Regenera-
tion Deal’ during large-scale regeneration efforts. Developers seek consensus from commu-
nities for their projects by hiring experts to broker deals with local residents, and protest 
themselves from the potential risk of not being able to acquire property (for the ultimate 
purpose of knocking  it down and rebuilding). This leads onto the next set of relationships 
developers curate: relationships with experts.  
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2.3 Developers’ reliance and work with other private sector actors 
 
Developers' relationship-building with the state and local communities has resulted in them 
assuming a reputation of being “a proactive agent who makes things happen” (Charney, 
2007: 1179). But their autonomy is contingent on an ability to mobilise political, cultural and 
increasingly financial resources (David and Halbert, 2014), and even 'spatial capital’ 
(Mosselson, this issue). They articulate and enact agency through the hiring of experts 
(Akers, 2015; Crosby and Henneberry, 2016; Robin, 2018), whose capacities and roles vary 
by institutional setting (De Magalhaes, 2001). For example, developers’ work with experts, 
such as broker and commercial consultants, enables them to navigate the financial risks of 
London, Johannesburg, Bangalore and Mexico City; to ‘translate’ the market and perceived 
risks, for investors (Brill and Robin, 2018; Corpatuax et al., 2009; David, 2012; Halbert and 
Rouanet, 2014). In this way developers are central actors in transcalar territorial networks 
of goervnance (Halbert and Rouanet, 2014).  
 
Work on transcalar territorial networks has drawn particular attention to how developers an-
chor the agendas of ‘far flung’ boardrooms in urban development (Ballard and Harrison, this 
issue). In particular, we see the importance of understanding the variegated developers in-
teractions with investors (van Loon, 2016). This dimension of urban development, whilst I 
do not operationalise the concept of financialisation here, recent debates on it (see Halbert 
and Attuyer, 2016; Aalbers, 2017) have afforded greater attention to developers’ strategies. 
In particular, showing how developers translate qualitative data into financial data to show 
specific returns (Bitterer and Heeg 2012; Halbert and Sanfelici, 2016; Theurillat and Cre-
voisier, 2013), shape calculative logics (David and Halbert, 2014) and help international ac-
tors filter away the noise or problems associated with highly localised development (Searle, 
2014; Rouanet and Halbert, 2016). At the same time, developers are required to engage 
with occupier needs and address these in project design (Fainstein, 2001; Guironnet et al., 
2016; Theurillat and Crevoisier, 2014). This pressure to deliver returns, especially as urban 
developments are assetised and made more liquid (Gotham, 2009; Fernandez et al. 2016; 
Fields, 2018; Weber, 2010; Ward and Swyngedouw, 2018), results in developers acquiring 
new skills. As Theurillat and Crevoisier show in a Swiss context, financialisation and the 
associated role of developers results in them having to develop the capacity to co-ordinate 
“various specialized development, construction and even management professionals” 
(Theurillat and Crevoisier 2013: 2058). 
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This role of mediator, which often places developers between the state and investors (Hof-
man and Aalbers, 2019; Theurillat and Crevoisier, 2013), encourages us to turn to Weber’s 
highly influential analysis of Chicago (2002; 2015). Weber has shown how developers in the 
early 2000s were heavily impacted by relationships with the financial sector. In ‘From Boom 
to Bubble: How Finance Built Chicago’ (2015) she argues developers took out loans to build 
generic office building in Chicago’s CBD, irrespective of demand and population needs. 
Tracing their motivations, Weber argues developers were incentivised to over-build during 
this period because of demand from financial institutions for loans which they could secu-
ritise for financial gain. In this respect Weber, through an actor-orientated analysis, demon-
strates the extent to which developers are heavily intertwined with other sectors, and how 
professional relationships which straddle industries impact developer strategies and have 
socio-material consequences for a city. 
 
This interdependence of different private sector actors within one city reveals the informality 
of the market and the club-like nature of real estate (Attuyer et al., 2012; Brill, 2018; Weber, 
2010). The recent proliferation of research on developers has, in this respect, repeatedly 
returned to earlier narratives on the importance of localisation (Wood, 2004; Ballard and 
Harrison, this issue). In doing so it demonstrates how development is characterised by in-
formal connections and trust, where a developer’s ability to source the necessary infor-
mation for making decisions is dependent on the extent to which they are integrated in local 
networks (Weinstein, 2014). The local nature of the development industry is also evident in 
Henneberry and Parris’ '‘ecology of real estate’ which highlights how actors depend on ‘net-
worked reputation’ (2013: 234). Social relations within the industry form latent networks 
which are transformed during development, and through these coalitions developers are 
able “to filter 'noise' - gossip, informal information and misinformation, trade stories and per-
sonal opinions - into market signals” (2013: 233). Informal exchanges therefore translate 
into strategic learnings for developers, but this requires them to actively engage with these 
networks (Brill, 2018). 
 
The extensive relational work developers do over the course of any real estate project there-
fore requires them to be constantly building relationships. This work is deliberate and time-
consuming. As Fainstein explains: “one developer compared his production to a movie pro-
duction, wherein he was the impresario who brought together the cast of architects, contrac-
tors, lawyers, accountants, financial consultants, investors, construction workers” (2001: 
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67). Responding to idea of the developer as a conductor or coordinator, this paper seeks to 
understand how developers respond to the networks they build over the course a project 
(and any risks these might pose)? It asks: how do developers’ responses further entrench 
or challenge their centrality in urban governance?  
 
3. Research Methodology 
 
This paper uses 30 in-depth interviews with people who work in London’s real estate sector, 
especially in Silvertown, conducted between June 2015 and June 2017. Interviews were 
primarily with private sector actors and the Greater London Authority (GLA), and lasted be-
tween 40 minutes and 2 hours. Interviewees were selected following documentary and dis-
course analysis of media reports, policies and Silvertown’s submitted masterplan, which 
were used to trace triangulate those who were involved during the planning application pro-
cess. This desk-based research, combined with analysis of commercial reports from each 
of the key firms working on the site, also informed biographical analysis of each of the key 
actors. This focused on mapping actors’ overlapping personal and professional histories, 
and was used to inform interviews. Following the biographical analysis and mapping of dif-
ferent firms’ and individuals’ involvement, selected interviewees were checked with two 
sources: the lead consultant and the GLA’s lead.  
 
Within the private sector, in an attempt to address the multiplicity of roles within real estate 
development processes, the following were interviewed: directors of the main development 
company, the lead consultants from each of the main consultancies working for the devel-
opers, architects and private sector planners. Since the focus of this analysis is the planning 
application stage of development, there was a deliberate attempt to cover the specialists 
associated with planning rules and regulation (eg heritage, community liaison). The inter-
views focused on (1) the strategies of the different actors, (2) what sources of information 
they used, (3) how they came to be involved in the project, (4) how they related to the rest 
of the development team and (5) their interactions with the planning authority. The interviews 
focused on the planning application stage of the development as the application was being 
made during the fieldwork period. 
 
From the public sector, interviews were conducted with core members of relevant GLA 
teams, including members of the regeneration team and the land and property department. 
In addition, interviews were conducted with local politicians and with key members of the 
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community. For the community and public sector, interviews focused on how (1) developers 
and other private sector actors were perceived; (2) type and means of interactions; (3) per-
ceptions about developer strength; and (4) alternative visions for the area. Learning from 
Rouanet and Halbert (2016), the actors are considered in terms of economic and political 
power, as well as their ability to articulate a cohesive vision for the site. Interviews were 
transcribed and coded in line with themes identified during preliminary research: looking at 
the agency of developers, the (potential) role of the state, and corporate strategies. 
 
In addition to documentary and discourse analysis, and interviews, some ethnographic work 
was carried out. Over the course of four years, I attended informal meetings and social 
events with those involved in London’s real estate. These meetings, often part of the indus-
try’s post-work drinks or networking events, were sites where real estate professionals ex-
changed perceptions on projects, likely market developments, and future ideas. During 
these experiences I primarily conducted participant observation, but on a few occasions real 
estate professionals were interviewed. Whilst these actors were not directly involved in the 
development of Silvertown and are therefore not included in this paper, they worked at prom-
inent real estate consultancies and were vital in informing my understanding of the develop-
ment process.  
 
4. Introducing Silvertown: the site, team and their project 
 
London’s Royal Docks are in the east of London (Map 1). The land is owned by a subsidiary 
of the mayor, Greater London Authority’s Land and Property ltd. (GLAP) and is subdivided 
with Silvertown Quays located in the south-west of the docks (Map 2). The local planning 
authority is the London Borough of Newham, who were (at the time of fieldwork) considered 
very pro-development (Duman et al., 2018). Aside from GLAP and Newnham’s roles in the 
area, the public sector also oversees development through the site’s Enterprise Zone status, 
the docks’ role within east London’s ‘Arc of Opportunity’, the guidance of the mayoral stra-
tegic planning authority and because the docks are one of the mayor’s identified ‘Opportunity 
Areas’. This complicated public sector involvement is often used by the private sector to 
explain why the site has not been redeveloped (Brownill and Carpenter, 2007). However, in 
2012, following extensive consultation between potential developers and the London Devel-
opment Agency, the GLA selected ‘preferred partners’ for some of the larger sites, including 
Silvertown Quays. Following this, the GLA signed a Master Development Agreement with 
‘The Silvertown Partnership’ (TSP) in 2013. 
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[insert Map 1, Map 2] 
 
Newham, the Mayor, the LDA and local personalities all united around the idea of regener-
ating the docks, and any differences between potential developers, the business-led LDA 
and Newham were overcome through the work of Clive Dutton, a regeneration expert who 
“was able to bring parties together, inspire and cajole, find the money and, often as not, put 
on a great show” (Bishop, 2015). Dutton had worked across the UK on regeneration projects 
(for example head of regeneration at Birmingham City Council) and was hired by Newham 
in 2009 to focus on ‘inward investment’ in the lead up to the London 2012 Olympic Games. 
In the docks, Dutton created a ‘Developers Forum’ to bring together those working in the 
area and create commercial confidence. 
 
Arguably, this phase exhibited many of the core characteristics of an urban regime (Dowding 
et al., 1999). A policy agenda centered on regeneration was sustained through a ‘grand 
coalition’, in this case across the LDA, Newham, the London Mayor and local interests, in a 
way which crosses sectoral and institution boundaries. Its longevity and capacity to mobilise 
extensive public and private sector resources was facilitated by strong or exceptional lead-
ership, by developers and entrepreneurial leaders in local government. However, in the 
Docks, in recent years, the politics around the regeneration agenda has received heightened 
attention. In particular, local artists and journalists have highlighted the deliberate courting 
of developers by both Newham and the London Mayor (Duman et al., 2018). There is, as 
this work attests to, a pressing need to understand how narratives around regeneration are 
applied as a marketing tool, and the consequences of this in terms of what gets built. Much 
of this activism focuses on the Royal Albert Docks, Silvertown's neighbour, and the idea of 
a ‘supernova’ of Chinese development which was employed metaphorically by the public 
sector to inspire investors. At the same time, in Silvertown, James (2018) points out, mar-
keting explicitly says “Silvertown is not for everyone”, it’s therefore important to understand 
how the processes which follow on from the local authorities’ marketing enabled developers 
to dominate the governance of subsequent development. 
 
Turning to the selected developers, TSP is a three-way consortium consisting of: Chelsfield, 
a global real estate company with offices in London, Paris, New York and Hong Kong (for-
merly run by Stuart Lipton); First Base, a London focused primarily residential developer 
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headed by Stuart’s son, Elliot Lipton; and Macquarie Capital, a global investment and finan-
cial services corporation. The partnership collectively set the project’s brief, with each com-
pany financially investing, and both Macquarie and First Base having specific tasks set out 
in development agreements between them and the partnership. First Base led the delivery 
of the project and as such had to secure the necessary documentation for the planning 
permission application. Outside the project, they act as the public face and are the primary 
people the public sector deals with. Within the project, they function as the co-ordinator of 
wider development processes, drawing together the necessary teams and mediating be-
tween the masterplanning exercise and formal governance institutions. Whilst a young com-
pany, relative to the wider London scene, they have experience in two of London’s most 
recent developments: the Olympic Village and Kings Cross. TSP are therefore significantly 
more complicated than the lean organisation Coiacetto (2001) identified in Australia and 
instead speaks to the idea that development organisations, in response to the need to un-
derstand ‘product location and timing’ (Adams et al. 2012), create a team with differing ex-
pertise in order to obtain the necessary skills. 
 
In 2012 TSP put forward a vision for a ‘brand destination’ for 3,000 new homes and 20,000 
new jobs. The idea was considered by others involved from the private sector to be “Very, 
very clever and forward thinking” (IC 2404/17). This praise extended to the public sector and 
TSP’s plan was strongly supported by the local state, as one public official explained: TSP 
“won the development bid on the basis that their proposition was bringing employment rather 
than purely residential” (Consultant 1 02/03/177). However, concerns around what the so-
cio-material realities of a brand destination would be began to surface quickly, as one con-
sultant explained:  
 
“I think it became clear after the bid was won that it [the brand destination] wouldn’t 
stack up on that basis. There weren’t sufficient numbers of people who would sign a 
cheque for their individual building” (Consultant 1 02/03/177). 
 
In response to the growing critiques, and concerns about the financial viability of the project, 
TSP put forward a moderated version of their plan. Their revised version was announced in 
2014, a year after winning the bid: “Our vision for Silvertown Quays will create a new piece 
of our city with entrepreneurship, innovation and knowledge economies at its heart”. Im-
portantly, despite some evolution of their vision, TSP remained contractually obliged to meet 
the objectives of their agreement with GLAP. Addressing this, TSP argued the agreement 
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would be upheld through the design of three main building typologies within the broad cate-
gory of ‘Brand Buildings’ (a phrasing they introduced, demonstrating their capacity to ‘carve 
out’ a space within the institutional setting). This enabled them to balance investor expecta-
tions and still be part of the “changing face in how brands engage - not about straight forward 
transactions” (RF 12/06/17). To market the site, they grounded it in existing understandings 
of London’s urban development, drawing on particular imaginations within London. Specifi-
cally, in media releases they identified and consolidated the view of themselves as ‘the new 
Shoreditch’: a centre for creativity elsewhere in London (Cahill, 2016). 
 
To implement their vision, TSP hired an extensive team of consultants. On the technical side 
they hired Fletcher Priest, London architects, to lead the urban design and planning appli-
cation process. Fletcher Priest worked directly with TSP’s selected town planning consult-
ants, Quod, another London based firm, who have a particular expertise in working with 
Newham. In addition to these core functions, the masterplan was informed by engineers 
from Arup, architectures from West8 in the Netherlands and London’s AKT II, and heritage 
specialists Donald Insall. The masterplanning process was characterised by “debates con-
ducted with project’s team, with a good degree of professional conduct and civility. There’s 
a sort of established way of thrashing out differences” (Consultant 6, March 2017). These 
differences were based on professional understandings, as well as individuals’ underlying 
motivations. Interviewees explained how for some in the project, it was about making Sil-
vertown into a place “where people want to be” (Developer 2, March 2017) or which would 
“make their grandchildren proud” (Consultant 3, June 2017). As one developer described 
their resultant position: “It doesn't matter what the professional background of that person is 
- it’s [about] sitting above the individual disciplines and getting them to talk together and 
keep them moving” (Developer 4, June 2017). Outside the planning application process, 
CBRE were hired to help direct the procurement of external funding for the project. There-
fore, throughout the early stages of development, TSP coordinated a body of experts, 
worked with multiple public sector bodies and engaged the local community.  
 
5. Responding to their wider network: creating multiple sub-centres of power 
 
In this section I address how the team outlined above, and the perceived political, community 
and financial risk (Geva and Rosen, 2018; Brill and Robin, 2018), shaped TSP’s strategy. I 
argue that in response to their vast team, TSP managed their experts and associated inter-
actions with communities and the public sector through three sub-centres of power. This 
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strongly contrasts with the idea of the developer as the sole co-ordinator and of an industry 
dominated by “atomised behaviour that anyone with the right frame of mind can be success-
ful” (Adams et al., 2012: 2582). 
 
Sub-centre 1: The technical lead 
 
The first sub-centre was the team lead for the technical dimensions of the masterplanning 
process. Acting on behalf of TSP and First Base, the lead at Fletcher Priest made the vast 
majority of the day to day decisions. He described his work as drawing together the “tech-
nical material supporting that [the masterplan]” which was “supported by design studies at 
a building scale, but abstracted into higher level special parameters that are in the environ-
mental assessment” (Consultant 1, March 2017). This illustrates the technical complexity of 
the process. As he explained it:  
 
“So part of the role of being lead consultant is to be able to lead and co-ordinate the 
design team [..] I think, one of the key things is that you get lots of people working 
who by definition have to go off and do their various things, and it’s about asking at 
what point do you have to control or bring them together” (Consultant 1, March 2017).  
 
Understanding the decision to hire a design-based technical lead in many ways helps inform 
the research agenda sketched out by Adams and Tiesdell who argue that one “research 
priority would be a thorough study of why attitudes to the value, benefits and costs of design 
vary between developers. This type of research needs to set design issues alongside other 
demands on corporate strategy” (2014: 298). The sub-centre lead’s technical knowledge, 
which TSP does not have in-house, allowed him to make judgements about how to bring 
together different understandings of the development trajectory. This technical role required 
navigating the socialised, and in many ways institutionalised through professional qualifica-
tions, approach to development (Harvey, 1989). As Tiesdell and Allmendinger, drawing on 
Harvey (1989) explain "property developers [..] firms and other organisations develop ‘house 
views’ relating to how they see the world” (2005: 70). Applying this to Silvertown, each of 
the consultants’ specialisms and associated professional development result in them per-
ceiving the plan in different ways, which requires leadership by the developer - or in this 
case the technical lead. 
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On the face of it, allowing the consultant to lead meant reducing TSP’s control over the 
process. However, to some extent, this impact was limited because TSP (by proxy First 
Base) remained relatively “hands on” (Developer 1, May 2017), taking the time to oversee 
any developments to the plan during weekly meetings formed. However, at a very detailed, 
technical level, decisions were led by Fletcher Priest. As the lead from First Base explained:  
 
“When we started with the re-looking at the masterplan I was probably sitting down 
with [Fletcher Priest] as our master-planner twice a week [..] we brought on other 
consultants to manage the environmental impact assessment, the other advice we 
needed” (Developer 1, May 2017).  
 
Sub-centre 2: The Development Manager  
 
First Base used in-house management expertise to navigate the relationship with Fletcher 
Priest. This relationship dictated the agency of the consultant lead since Fletcher Priest’s 
control of the situation “depends on the degree to which there’s a specific project manager 
as a discipline [..] or whether the client has project management in house” (Consultant 1, 
March 2017), which First Base did. This leads to the second sub-centre of power, the de-
velopment manager at First Base, who mediated between technical knowledge and the pub-
lic sector, and aligned technical knowledge (the Masterplan, Design and Access Statement 
and the Design Codes) with investor expectations.  
 
This role was seen by most interviewed to be a general management position and in Sil-
vertown, “in terms of development or project management services that’s one of the things 
First Base brings” (Consultant 1, March 2017) - there was an understanding “within the gen-
eral organisation of how the information feeds in to any different stage of the process” (De-
veloper 1, May 2017). This included bringing together TSP’s vision to sell to investors, a 
process which was largely described as ‘story telling’ (ibid.). This required the development 
manager to forge relationships across consultancies, to understand how different forms of 
expertise fed into the design process, and then relate this to potential financiers. As on in-
terviewee explained: 
 
As a development manager you have to “If you say to most investors, who might be 
based in China or Singapore or Kuala Lumpur, ‘we’re going to do a project in West-
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minster in London’, they go ‘ok we understand where that is’ - the Houses of Parlia-
ment etc. If you say ‘we’re going to do a project in Newham’ - they go ‘where is it, in 
Manchester?’ So you do have to spend a lot more time. And you have to do more in 
terms of demonstrating why it’s a good thing to invest in.” (Developer 1, May 2017). 
 
As is evident in the quote, the first part of the management role is very much centred on 
mitigating financial risk, loss of investor confidence and defining the market(ability) of the 
project. Positioning the project as an asset for investors, First Base’s Director worked with 
CBRE to connect with potential investors. This process was complicated by the structure of 
TSP. The three way division of powers (and responsibilities) meant Macquarie Capital were 
largely responsible for bringing in the majority of funding. As one interviewee explained: “For 
them, that was just an investment. And to assist in terms of procurement of the funder. In 
the same way we have a development management role they have a fund advisory role” 
(Developer 1 26/05/17). This should have meant First Base took a backseat, but the nature 
of the individuals involved in the project meant First Base remained involved. This reveals 
how the process of integrating financial expectations into overarching development patterns 
is contingent on the corporate structure. In this case, the decision by First Base to remain 
heavily involved directly shaped the extent to which financial logics will have been integrated 
into the design process, since it was mediated through the development manager, who di-
rectly represented and propagated TSP’s vision. 
 
The second part of this management role is about developing and maintaining public sector 
and community relations. In much the way financialisation literature identifies the way de-
velopers are positioned between the state and investors (Weber, 2015), in Silvertown this 
position was occupied by the development manager. In this case, First Base led meetings 
with the planning authority, Newham. This relationship was described as relatively easy to 
manage because planning was seen as “rational” and “not restrictive” (Developer 1, May 
2017). TSP still had to interact extensively with the public sector though, especially debating 
affordable housing, because the UK planning system has explicitly embedded developers’ 
viability in planning gain discussions with the state (Christophers, 2014). 
 
In Silvertown interaction with the state was further complicated because the land is publicly 
owned, where TSP interacted constantly with GLAP. As was explained: “they own the land, 
[TSP] have a development agreement with the GLA which sets the rules and objectives of 
what we’re trying to achieve and we have to report to them [..] in the same way that we 
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report to the Silvertown Partnership” (Developer 1, May 2017). Despite this, TSP still saw 
the role of GLAP positively: “You’ve got a joint venture partner in the GLA which is absolutely 
wedded to regeneration in the docks and you've got a very willing local authority who wants 
to see jobs for its residents. And you know, that’s a great starting point”. GLAP was therefore 
not necessarily a constraint on development, as the planning media noted “by and large, 
they have also shown the GLA acting as catalyst to development, as opposed to a bureau-
cratic hurdle” (Northey, 2015). But being pro-development did not mean TSP were exempt 
from planning requirements: “You can do a joint venture with a local authority, but at sort of 
top level it doesn't buy you any favours through the planning processes, you’ve still got to 
meet the rules” (Developer 1, May 2017). Understanding how such ‘rules’ were to be inter-
preted, especially in line with GLAP priorities, was the responsibility of the development 
manager.  
 
Sub-centre 3: The Project Figurehead  
 
The final sub-centre of power was Stuart Lipton who functioned as a figurehead for the 
development and in doing so garnered wide-ranging support, media interest and respect 
from those within the real estate community. His role helped to mitigate risk from wider ob-
jection (Geva and Rosen, 2018), as well as more broadly assisted in minimising political and 
financial risk through his networked reputation (Henneberry and Parris, 2013). Additionally, 
Lipton can be understood to have helped translate the periphery of London to a less risky 
location for investment (David, 2012).  
 
Lipton’s role was explained by a lead consultant: “What’s interesting is to understand the 
role of somebody who might be driving it as a figurehead [..] Which is his incredibly important 
role” (Consultant 11, March 2017). After leaving Chelsfield, Stuart functioned as the face of 
the scheme which was widely scrutinised because of its size and relative strategic im-
portance within a brownfield-prioritising planning system and neighbouring City Airport de-
velopment. Lipton’s role as a figurehead in this respect was important because it enabled 
TSP to leverage media support for Lipton and to promote their peripherally located devel-
opment in mainstream media. This in turn increased the prominence of Silvertown, helping 
establish it on the map of potential investment in London (Developer 1, May 2017), and 
whilst the bulk of investment decisions are likely a reflection of the details of plans, having 
Lipton involved in the project brought credence to its (financial) potential. 
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6. The consequences of sub-centres of power for urban governance  
 
The web of consultants and consequential pluralistic centers of co-ordination influenced the 
governance of the site by making the system more opaque. Specifically, the multiple levels 
of co-ordination within the realms of the private sector had two consequences: (1) they in-
ternalised decisions to the private sector; and (2) they confused people external to the or-
ganisation. These directly shaped TSP’s capacity to navigate urban governance settings 
because it enabled them to limit the number of options put to wider debate and divorce 
themselves from the consultation process, thereby reducing scrutiny of their project. 
 
Consequence 1: internalisation of decision-making   
 
The first consequence of such extensive co-ordination is the internalisation of decision- mak-
ing to the private sector. Throughout the development process, especially in the early 
stages, consultant team meetings provided opportunities for different experts and even the 
public sector to shape the developmental outcomes. During these meetings the develop-
ment manager co-ordinates the process and within this they dictate the agenda, where ideas 
advanced by consultants which are deemed ‘less appropriate’ are never made public. One 
particular example, repeatedly addressed during interviews, was water management. In var-
ious interviews developers and engineers returned to the issue of how to manage the water 
in the docks and leverage its potential to benefit the site. This began when one manager 
explained that First Base are “innovative” and wanted to “push the boundaries” of normal 
practices (Developer 1, May 2017), in particular through a novel approach to water manage-
ment. As he and the engineer involved explained, this would reduce the environmental im-
pact of the water (Engineer 1, April, 2017). However, the planning system had little guidance 
on how to deal with this and so whilst the developer and some consultants had explored its 
potential, the idea was never made part of the public discourse because it may have signif-
icantly delayed planning applications. 
 
The impact of the internalisation was exacerbated by the nature of who is included in con-
sultant meetings. Whilst there is an element of diversity in design professionals, it is worth 
noting, as was highlighted during a moment of critical self-reflection by one consultant, that 
the views of consultants remain relatively narrow:  
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“I’m always conscious in design team meetings [that] we’re all speaking from broadly 
educated, design interested, backgrounds. And so while we do represent many 
views, we can’t represent all views.” (Consultant 8, March 2017).  
 
This statement implicitly acknowledges that the realms of design expert debates are per-
haps ignorant - or at least less mindful - of the views of communities and non-experts. In-
stead, the focus is on integrating perspectives which the consultant quoted above consid-
ered relatively similar. In many ways this was echoed by another of the niche consultants 
who noted that in design meetings “you’re already working with people that are selected for 
being on the same wave length, as are all the people working for the partnership” (Architect 
1 February 2017). This shared understanding is perceived to be vital for developers though: 
it allows them to meet development goals on time. As such, TSP specifically debated options 
within their organisation, rather than opening it to external debate.  
 
Echoing existing analysis on risk (see Geva and Rosen, 2018), one interviewee explained: 
“for developers like First Base, the thing that hurts your return the most is time. It takes you 
longer to do stuff, the cost of money holds you down. There’s always this balance between 
challenging the norm and actually delivering on time” (Developer 4, April 2017; Brill and 
Robin, 2018). This reveals the role of time in linking financial threats to urban governance. 
Any time ‘wasted’ is understood as money lost, therefore decisions are rushed which could 
have significantly negative consequences. In response to time pressure developers inter-
nalise decisions. Addressing this in interviews, most discussions centered on the cumber-
some nature of planning authorities which mimicked narratives around planners as ‘time 
wasters’ (Clifford, 2016), and instead there was a desire to have structures that enable de-
velopers “to act freely to get on with the process of making development happen” (Raco, 
2013: 177). 
 
Moreover, because of the involvement of the GLAP as strategic partners and the pro-devel-
opment stance of Newham (Duman et al., 2018), delivering jobs and housing in a timely 
manner was perceived to be of upmost importance. Indeed, across the UK public authorities 
are increasingly under pressure to get planning applications through on time. As Clifford 
(2016) notes, the shift from development control to development management by UK plan-
ning authorities has been accompanied by the instigation of time related targets. These put 
pressure on the planning authorities to address applications within a specific time, with the 
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threat of national government intervention if they consistently fail to meet them (HM Treas-
ury, 2015). This time-related incentive is therefore shared by different actors within the de-
velopment process and not only encourages a more opaque decision-making process, but 
also perverts the extent to which policy evolution occurs. Moreover, the longevity of the 
attempts to regenerate the docks underpinned this sense of urgency, evident in both policy 
discourses and interviews. 
 
Consequence 2: A more opaque public consultation  
 
The second consequence of multiple layers of co-ordination develops from the internalisa-
tion of decision-making. With more consultants involved in the site, it becomes increasingly 
challenging to understand the division of responsibilities. This is especially true for those 
outside of the development organisation, and in Silvertown it directly limited the community’s 
capacity to engage. A big challenge for those who live in the area and are involved in the 
site or who want to shape the development trajectory, who are not part of the official devel-
opment organisation, is understanding who has control or jurisdiction. During one field visit, 
a local historian explained: as far as he was concerned, people in the area struggled to 
understand who was in charge of the development and therefore who to ask questions to. 
This confusion was compounded by the division of landownership and development rights, 
where even those on the site struggled to fully recollect the division of rights:  
 
“They own 70% of the land, not an exact figure, but there’s a portion of the site that 
is still owned by Newham. But basically the ownership is in the public realm. There 
are some complex ownerships” (Engineer 5, March 2017).  
 
As is evident in this quote, despite having extensively surveyed the land as part of his work, 
the engineer was unable to fully articulate the different land rights. Interviews with local com-
munity leaders suggested that the complex division of land ownership inhibited those who 
wished to engage with the development process. 
 
The initial problems of understanding who has the rights to develop particular areas were 
compounded by TSP’s approach to participation. Public participation is a mandatory part of 
planning processes in the UK and whilst existing research has noted the main pitfalls of such 
an approach (Healey, 1998; Coaffee and Healey, 2003), it remains a key tool in a local 
communities’ capacity to shape what might happen to an area. 
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In the case of Silvertown, TSP hired London Communications Agency (LCA) to lead this 
process. LCA are a public relations firm who specialise in the built environment and work 
across London. Luckily for LCA and TSP "the Liptons have certainly been seen as people 
doing a lot of good for the area that can bring or can help deliver the regeneration of the 
Docks as a whole and Silvertown in particular” (Consultant 10, March 2015). However, “Stu-
art doesn’t walk in to a room of consultation events around a table like this with you know 
15 local stakeholders and you know the headmistress of the school” (Consultant 10, March 
2015). Rather LCA were hired to do this work and establish the necessary relationships with 
the local community, including addressing any risk they might pose to the development. TSP 
explained their involvement as part of “a comprehensive pre-application consultation pro-
cess [..] first with key identified stakeholders and then a two stage process with the wider 
public” (Fletcher Priest, 2014).  
 
The first part of consultation with the public was two exhibitions where TSP displayed their 
vision for the site and the community was invited to respond. In their subsequent Design 
and Access statement, TSP highlighted the community’s primary concerns. The first major 
theme was around what would happen to a historical building, the Millennium Mills, including 
its restoration. This is a key part of the scheme as envisioned by TSP, therefore these con-
cerns were pacified by referencing the centrality of the rebuilding. The second theme was 
integrating existing neighbourhoods, especially Britannia Urban Village which directly neigh-
bours the site, which TSP noted would be acknowledged in their Design Codes (2014). Fi-
nally, concerns around transport integration were raised and TSP responded by noting they 
were in continual dialogue with Newham and Transport for London about how best to pro-
ceed. These responses can be seen to reflect the flexibility Robin (2018) notes in her anal-
ysis of the King’s Cross team’s responses to community concerns. Additionally, the depth 
of their engagement can be understood to reflect the ‘tokenistic’ nature of many participatory 
approaches (Arnstein, 1969) where the wishes of those consulted are never fully considered 
(Peterman, 2000) and instead perceived value-free responses by developers enable them 
to marginalise any radical alternatives (Allemdinger and Haughton, 2012). 
 
In terms of understanding the impact of the sub-centres of power, it is necessary to look at 
how LCA shaped the consultation process. In parallel to the exhibition were a number of 
LCA initiatives, some of which are standard community consultation processes such as leaf-
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letting, whilst others were more innovative. For LCA, the approach adopted to mitigate com-
munity risks has to be tailored to the site, as was explained during one interview, even for 
more traditional approaches “You’re always going to have to find an agreeable catchment 
area in which you're going to leaflet drop and write to everyone” (Consultant 10, May 2015). 
These approaches were considered necessary for part of the “robust” planning procedures, 
but as is indicative in the following quote, LCA perceived them to be less interesting, prefer-
ring to engage in different ways: “the fact that we have very active schools in the local com-
munity is very helpful but we still write to everybody, publish in the local papers - all those 
sorts of, kind of, requirements” (Consultant 10, May 2015). This level of activity was also 
reflected upon during interviews with local school and community leaders. In this respect 
LCA can be seen to have defined who was the ‘community’, facilitated at least in part by the 
institutional setting where the developer is responsible for community engagement rather 
than the local authority, and by engaging with participatory approaches, are capable of de-
fining whose voice was a legitimate representation of community. Their resultant conceptu-
alisation of community speaks to what Healey (1998) has highlighted are the limitations of 
community-led development, where the concept of community is used to refer to those who 
are in opposition to developers or business. 
 
When developing a more site-specific approach, LCA focused on local schools: “schools 
are very helpful because young people are the most excited about what’s going on there - 
they’re the people that live there and that Newham would hope would one day would work 
and stay there rather than getting to whatever age and leaving”. For them, working with 
children was important because “getting them on side - telling them about the history it’s 
very easy to get them engaged and from that to then go home” and tell their parents about 
the schemes (Consultant 10, May 2015). LCA also “got artists on site - a more touchy-feely 
PR way but also very important in the project as a whole” (Consultant 10, May 2015) in 
terms of the focus on creativity more generally. Such funding of artistic projects was some-
thing members of the community were drawn to, during an interview with one local they 
highlighted that LCA and TSP were prepared to sponsor a range of events - even a dance 
show. This created a general sense of positivity towards these organisations.  
 
In this respect, LCA can be understood to have formed a core element of what Geva and 
Rosen (2018) and Brill and Robin (2018) have categorised as developers’ political or com-
munity risk mitigation. It was through LCA that the community were meant to channel con-
cerns to TSP. Yet in Silvertown, LCA and TSP became synonymous, one local community 
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member explained “you just have to talk to [LCA]”. This directly builds on earlier analysis of 
how structural changes to the British planning system have enabled the proliferation of plan-
ning consultants and experts who then function in ‘anti-political machines’ (Raco et al., 
2016). For Raco et al pluralism in planning or “is being mediated through these machine-
like arrangements” which leave little room for citizen engagement (2016: 236). Whilst the 
example of the LCA undoubtedly supports this to some extent, it also demonstrates how for 
some period of time the community did have a clear point of contact. However, this contact 
was from a public relations firm, rather than the developer.  
 
Additionally, The impact of LCA was compounded because they had little access to the 
actual masterplanning process, and by the time the planning application was submitted they 
were no longer working for TSP. This distance from the developer and change of circum-
stance both exacerbated the communities’ difficulties in trying to understand who they could 
contact when the application went to be discussed by the planning authority. The ways in 
which TSP dealt with the community therefore adds further complexity to the impact of sub-
centres of power because it shows how it creates opacity and also reveals how the structure 
of the relationships within the private sector, the frequency and quality of communication, 
and the length of consultants’ involvement shapes the way devolving control over participa-
tion to a consultant impacts development outcomes.  
 
7. Conclusion  
This paper makes three key contributions to the on-going theorisation of the private sector 
in urban governance. Firstly, building on the existing literature on real estate developers, by 
beginning analysis from their perspective, it informs a critical engagement with their strategy. 
If the aim of a developer is to build their project and maximise profits, then, supporting re-
search on the relational work of developers, the case of Silvertown shows that developers’ 
work is about forming strategic alliances that enable this. These relationships not only facil-
itate the gathering of knowledge and feed into an increasingly professionalised development 
scene (Hofman and Aalbers, 2019), but also enable developers to dominate governance 
situations. In this paper, advancing these arguments I show the next stage of the corporate 
response: the creation of sub-centres of power which facilitate the developers’ capacity to 
orchestrate development processes. 
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Secondly, in critically engaging with the resultant network and sub-centres of power, this 
paper advances understandings of how such corporate strategies directly and indirectly feed 
into wider interactions between the public and private sector. Specifically, I argue developers 
are able to reduce external critique of potential ideas voiced by consultants during the plan-
ning process. Additionally, by hiring PR firms and devolving control of participatory pro-
cesses, developers are able to obscure who is perceived to be in control of development, 
thus sheltering themselves from extensive debate. This is important to understand in the 
context of expert-led forms of urban development (Robin, 2018) because it can help inform 
public sector and community engagement strategies. 
 
Finally, both of these outcomes ensure the developer maintains a central position in de-
bates, but they are also demonstrably driven by time-pressures. By focusing on how time 
shaped the developer’s strategies, I revealed the practice through which the private and 
public sectors align. This of particular importance because of the way interests in the docks 
assembled around the idea of ‘regeneration’ and the perceived ‘problems’ of the area. 
Across those interviewed, the idea that the docks regeneration was urgent underpinned the 
drive for a ‘coalition’ centred on general economic improvement (see Stone, 1989), rather 
than specific business interests.  
 
This paper focused on the period of planning application, but as projects develop different 
relationships become increasingly important. It is therefore necessary for future research to 
continue this agenda, addressing the work of the developer using an insider perspective in 
an effort to understand how their strategies - be they deliberate or the by-product of others’ 
actions - influence their agency and position in governance. Moreover, in demonstrating how 
the developer employs such extensive consultant teams and their relative power once hired, 
in terms of the developer being reliant on them for their specific task, sheds light on the 
forces internal to the private sector which challenge developer agency. This suggests the 
need for research that unpacks how contrasting understandings within the private sector 
have demonstrative material impacts.  
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